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BOOK REVIEWS
BooKs FAMOUS IN THE LAW. By Frederick C. Hicks. Rochester:
The Lawyers' Cooperative Publishing Co. 1921. Pp. 259.

MEN AND

Professor Hicks has done for a few great lawyers and ·a few great
books what it is hoped he may do for many more lawyers and many more
books. Out of his full and intimate knowledge of the literature of our profession he has gathered and presented to us in most entertaining fashion the
human as well as the intellectual and professional characteristics of a full
half dozen men, each of whom holds a somewhat unique place in the development of Anglo-Saxon law.
An introduction by Dean Harlan F. Stone, of Columbia, comments on
the general topic of legal education and contrasts the methods of today with
those of its earlier history. Referring to the case method of instruction,
Dean Stone says : "In such a scheme of things there is small scope for the
authoritative pronouncements of any individual, however penetrating his
intellect and however gifted he may be in his powers of expression. It rejects
the pedantry of Coke, it sets little store by the artificial reasoning of Blackstone, and it prefers the opinions of Kent the judge and the chancellor to
the mellifluous passages of Kent the commentator." He goes on to say
that in this modern atmosphere the figures and the books of the great lawyers discussed by Professor Hicks are becoming "shadowy and indistinct"
and that this little book of Professor Hicks "challenges the attention with
the query whether we have done well to let them become so."
The book opens with a stimulating chapter on the "Human Appeal of
Law Books," in which the author touches upon their character as literature,
as historical and biographical material, and their interest from the point of
view of how they came to be-their story. The following chapter, "Cowell's
Interpreter," gives us the story of a man and a book of whom arid of which
many a lawyer of this day never heard, and yet it is a most fascinating tale.
That a Professor of Law, more than five hundred years ago, should conceive
that he might advantage the profession and the state by making a dictionary
of the law, and doing so should set the kingdom of England on fire, should
claim the attention of the King, of the House of Lords, and of the House
of Commons for more than a month, should be investigated' by a committee
of fifty of the House of Lords, which included two Archbishops, thirteen
Bishops, thirteen Earls, a Viscount, twenty-one Lords and the Lords Chancellor, Treasurer, Privy Seal, Admiral and Chamberlain, and by a committee
of the House of Commons consisting of the whole Privy Council, the Attorney and Solicitor General, the Recorder and eighteen other members; that
he should call down the wrath of Lord Coke and the proclamation of the
King suppressing the book-that a poor Professor of Civil Law could write
a bit of a law dictionary of two hundred and ninety-two leaves, and incite
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all this, is to suggest that indeed here is the material for the interesting
tale Professor Hicks has given us in his second chapter.
Nor will our interest lag through the two following chapters given over
to "Lord Coke and His Reports and Institutes," and to "Littleton and Coke
upon Littleton." -Lord Coke's two great legal works "might well have been
the product of a lifetime largely devoted to scholarship," and yet they were
written by one who, called to the bar in 1578, found time to discharge his
duties as Reader in Lyon's Inn, Recorder of Coventry and of Norwich,
Bencher of Inner Temple, Recorder of London, Solicitor General, Reader
to Inner Temple, Member from Norfolk, Speaker of the House of Commons,
Attorney General, Chief Justice of' the Common Pleas, and later of the
King's Bench, Member of the Privy Council, High Steward of Cambridge
University, and consecutively as Member from Coventry, Norfolk and Buckingham, a career extending from 1578 to 1634. During this period he also
found time to conduct a most bitter controversy with Lord Bacon, then
Attorney General, to get himself suspended from the Chief J usticeship, and
finally to be removed from office and spend a term in the tower. Indeed, it
was dangerous business, this writing of law books in that early day.
vVe are led to wonder sometimes in these latter days whether law
books are written as pigs are sold, by the pound, or as the hod is carried,
by the day. To write a law book to help one's own son to comprehend one
of the most difficult of all law subjects, is to write it under conditions calling upon the best that is in one. These conditions produced a legal classic
which has remained such through more than six hundred years, Littleton's
"New Tenures," or in the Law French in which it was first printed, "Tenores
Novelli." When Coke incorporated this into his "Institutes" with his commentaries upon it, "it was a virtual piling of Pelion on Ossa, enabling the
law student to scale the heights of legal learning," or, as Wambaugh's phrase
is, the result is the "most conspicuous example of a masterpiece upon a masterpiece-much as if the plays of Shakespeare were entwined about the
Canterbury Tales." Out of these facts, again, has Professor Hicks woven
a story of most fascinatingly dramatic interest.
In the chapter on Sir William Blackstone and his Commentaries we get
an account of the preparation of the book, its author's methods of work and
its reception by the profession. We find our old sulphuric friend, Jeremy
Bentham, pitching into it, sometimes with a bludgeon and sometimes with a
stiletto; Professor Amos calling it the "charnel house of dead law"; the
great Kent saying of the third volume, "it requires but ordinary talents and
industry to compile such a volume"; and! President Jefferson saying of the
Commentaries, "they have been perverted more than all others to the degeneracy of legal science." But despite such attacks our author is led to say
that "few law books have •been so generally received with approbation by
succeeding generations." And even our iconoclastic friend Bentham was
compelled to say of Blackstone that "of all institutional writers he was the
first to teach jurisprudence to speak the language of the scholar and the
gentleman," but he must add that this quality made the Commentaries the
more dangerous.
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But the editor reminds me that his plans for this number of the REmw
involve the publishing of some other good material and this must be cut off.
The succeeding chapters deal in the same interesting way with three of our
own great law writers of the earlier period, Professor James Kent, Edward
Livingston, and Henry Wheaton. I ought to be permitted to tell something
of what is in these later chapters, but am not. It's good stuff.
The book is supplemented with an Appendbc of bibliographical suggestions, not less valuable than the matter it supplements.
There may be as delightful reading as "Men and Books Famous in the
Law," which law students or the lawyer with a scholarly interest in his prcr
fession may pick up for an odd hour or two, but they are far to seek. I
don't know Professor Hicks. I don't know whether he smokes a pipe,-an
awfully bad habit,-but if one reads his book he'll fancy he's by the professor's fireside with" the professor in his house coat and slippers, smoking his
pipe and' telling his story.
V. H. LANE.
CASES ON THE LAW oF CONTRACTS. By George P. Costigan, Jr. Chicago:
Callaghan & Co. 1921. Pp. xxviii, 1489.
CASES ON THE LAw oF CoNTRACTS. By Arthur L. Corbin. St. Paul: West
Publishing Co. 1921. Pp. xxiv, 1514It was to be anticipated that such able and thorough workers in the
field as Professors Costigan and Corbin would, sooner or later, give us the
benefit of the maturity of thought resulting from their many years of e..xperience in teaching the law of Contracts. It is gratifying to note that both
books evidence a high order of scholarship. Of course, no book on this
subject could be e..xpected to fail to show traces of the influence exerted by
the epoch-making collections of Langdell and Williston, and the authors do
not pretend that they have produced anything revolutionary. The topics
presented and the relative proportions of space devoted' to each in the two
books are in the main the same, and in this respect they do not differ radically from the earlier collections. The points of departure consist principally in the choice and topical arrangement of the materials, in the order of
development of the subject matter, and in the point of view presented.
Approximately two-thirds to three-fourths of the cases do not appear in the
earlier collections.
Professor Costigan has avowedly emphasized the historical side of the
subject, although it must not be supposed that the modern d·evelopments
have been neglected. At least two-thirds of the cases are American. At
appropriate places there have been inserted excerpts from text-writers and
from writers of Law Review articles on historical points. These have been
put in, so the author tells us, not primarily for classroom use, but rather
with the hope that the student will gain enough from them to make him
curious to know more about the history of the subject. Only the barest outline of topics is presented. Sub-headings have been entirely omitted except
in case of the topic Performance, and here only a very few have been inserted.
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A careful index is appended to make possible a ready reference to the assembled materials. One feature, which seems to the present writer to be of
doubtful utility, is the addition of quite copious foot-notes, many of which
do not merely state similar problems and variations of the questions raised
by the principal case but in addition and in large measure contain e.."(cerpts
from opinions in other cases or statements by the author which give the
solution, not only of the problem in the principal case, but also of the suggested problems. These notes are invaluable to the teacher, but often, it
seems to the reviewer, are inimical to the best interests of the student, since
they do not leave enough to his own initiative. Professor Costigan follows
the historical order and treats of Sealed Contracts first. The cases on the
Statute of Frauds are placed after those on Performance and Illegality and
before the cases on the subject of the Discharge of Contracts.
Professor Corbin's avowed object is in some respects a more immediately
practical one. His collection is intended primarily to furnish introductory
material to answer the question, "What are our American Courts going to
decide tomorrow?" Accordingly" we find that more than one-third of the
cases included have been decided since 1900, while less than one-third are
English cases. There is very little in the collection that is of merely historical value. '!'he main topics have been subdivided to a considerable extent,
the sub-headings suggesting the content of the cases included thereunder.
No doubt, reasonable men may well differ in regard to the question as to
whether Professor Corbin's practice in this matter is to be preferred. A
careful index is appended. The text is not overburdened with foot-notes,
although there is a sufficient number to indicate the trend of the authorities
and to suggest variations in the principles presented in the cases. Enough
is left to the imagination of the student to stimulate his curiosity. The cases
on the Statute• of Frauds are placed at the very end of the book, while those
relating to Third Party Beneficiaries, Assignment, and Joint Contractors
come after the cases on the Discharge of Contract and before the subject
of Illegality.
Both books have more material on the nature of offers than is found
in the earlier collections, and this seems to be a commendable feature.
The present writer hesitates to express any opinion in regard to the
order of treatment and the teachability of the materials, for the reason that
the only safe test to determine the desirability of a case book in these respects
is, after all, the test of actual use in the classroollL In view of the recognized ability and> long experience of both authors in using the cases and
other authorities here gathered together, it is safe to assume that their books
will not be found wanting in these particulars. With these books added to
those already in general use, the teacher of Contracts has an imposing array
from which to choose.
GROV'i;:R

c. GRISMO~.
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PRINCIPL1'S oF Gov.:RNM1'NT AccouNTING AND REPORTING. By Francis Oakey.
New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1921. Pp. xxvii, 561.
Most of the problems of financial administration in government affairs
seem to have their origin in poor accounting methods, and attempts to solve
them have brought to the front two principal proposals with regard to
accounting procedure. One of these proposals outlines a rather unreserved
application of commercial principles to public finance; the other, although
advocating a change from the unscientific cash basis, is very much opposed
to an unmodified extension of commercial practice to a situation only slightly
related to "profit and loss" business. In "Principles of Government Accounting and Reporting" these two lines of thought have been brought into intelligible contradistinction; and it must be remarked that no style of presentation could be better adapted to the needs of the inquiring student
Mr. Oakey is one of the opponents of the so-called commercial idea.
He takes the position that rational accounting exhibits of governments can
relate on the one side only to such resources as are of the "realizable" variety,
like cash and ta.'Ces receivable, and on the other to obligations, like "warrants
payable," which are in the usual parlance designated "current liabilities."
That is to say, only the operations of current expendable funds are significant for administrative purposes. In taking this attitude the author comes
to issue with the familiar declaration of the "commercialists" that financial
statements should render pecuniary reflection of "all that a government owes
and all that it owns," or, more specifically, that fixed properties and bonded
debt are essential items in the balance sheet of any government. He argues
that debt of the character of a bonded obligation cannot logically be opposed
in a balance sheet to funds which have not benefited from its incurrence and
to properties which could not possibly be employed toward its liquidation;
in short, that bonded debt is a lien upon municipal credit and taxing power
not susceptible of articulation in terms of dollars and cents. Of course, it
is understaod that both the debt and its sinking fund must be reported in
some form, but certainly not as an item specifically related to the appraised
value of unsalable fixed assets and to the apparently realizable value of current resources. That accounting for fixed properties would be accomplished
on some other basis than that of pecuniary value naturally follows; and the
standard of measurement which the author has chosen is "capacity to serve,"
that is, capacity as determined on_ the basis of remaining service life and of
general efficiency in supplying the needs of the public. It is emphasized
throughout that financial statements should be written in terms which have
a real significance to particular periods of operation.
As to methods of accounting and reporting which occupy rather a middle
position in relation to those which have been mentioned, the author.has little
to say, except for the numerous excellent citations of cases from actual practice and a paragraph or so of criticism made in the light of the principal
theories.
Since Mr. Oakey is himseH primarily an accountant, one can easily see
why he centers his argument on matters of accounting procedure. The
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reviewer believes that this circumstance has had none but a beneficial effect.
The writer's method makes it possible for the student to proceed from the
particular to the general, from the mere framework of finance to an apprehension of the broad principles of reporting. But it must not be gathered
from this that the book is a tedious recitation of bookkeeping forms and a
meaningless guide for the making of debits and credits out of the transactions of the government. There is very little said about such details, although
enough is said to give scientific coherence to the treatment.
The chapters entitled "The Budget as a Report" and "The Financial
Condition of the Government as a Whole" are pleasing departures from the
usual scheme of presentation. They are effective in reminding the student
of the expedient and the essential in the preparation of public budgets and
in the problems of general public finance. And the merits of the study in
respect to the definition of terms used, and the application of those terms in
the field of practice, are worthy of favorable notice. The reader will find a
thorough discussion of "funds," "appropriations," "government receipts and
·disbursements," "stores," "debt limit, natural and legal,'' and the usual current assets and liabilities found in government exhibits.
The author deals with his theme in a manner consistent with his understanding of accounting as "the science of producing promptly and presenting
clearly the facts relating to financial condition and the operations that are
required as a basis of management." Public administrators should• not be
compelled to take time from the exercise of wise vision to supply the deficiencies of inadequate and unintelligible accounting and reporting.
University of Michigan.
R. G. WALKER.
THI~ QUESTION OF ABORIGINES IN THS LAW AND PRAcTICS OF NATIONS.

Alpheus Henry Snow.
v, 376.

By
New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 192I. Pp.

In l9I8 the Department of State requested the author to "undertake the
task of collecting, arranging, and, so far as he may deem necessary, editing
the authorities and documents relating to the subject of 'Aborigines in the
Law and Practice of Nations.'" This volume was written in response to
the Department's request.
By aborigines the author means uncivilized natives in the colonies of
civilized states. The question of aborigines is formulated as follows: "First,
what are the general principles of the law of nations which the colonizing
states respectively have recognized and now 'recognize and apply, as governing their respective relations with the uncivilized tribes which were inhabiting
the regions colonized by them at the time they respectively assumed the
sovereignty of the regions? Second, to what extent and on what principles
have civilized states cooperated with each other in recognizing and applying
these principles?" (Pp. l7-I8.)
The peace of I763 between France and Great Britain is taken as the
beginning of the modern law on the subject. In the treaties of that year
native tribes were regarded as having virtually no rights whatever. But a

BOOK REVIEWS

377

somewhat more generous attitude is thought to have developed under the
influence of the democratizing and humanitarian movements of t~e last
quarter of the eighteenth century. Aborigines have come to be regard·ed
as wards of the state exercising sovereignty over them. After reviewing
the development of theory as regards the relation between the state and its
colonies and native tribes, the author concludes "that the power which a
civilized state exercises over all its colonies and dependencies is, according
to the law of nations, a power of trusteeship, and that the power of guardianship over. its dependent aboriginal tribes is one of the manifestations of this
general power." (P. u3.)
This whole theory impresses the reviewer, it may as well be confessed,
as a bit fantastic, to say the least. It is beautiful, if true. But is it true?
The analogies with trusteeship, guardianship, and agency in private law seem
far-fetched. (See, for example, pp. 108, no, 323.) The whole seems somewhat remote from the familiar facts of colonial expansion during the past
century. It is questioned whether the subject ought to be regarded as a part
of the law of nations in any appropriate sense of that much abused term.
The author himself appears to have misgivings on this latter point, for he
says that the matter is governed by the law of nations, "though not by the
body of rules which apply between civilized states to which the name inter•
national law is properly applied." (P. no.)
The reviewer wishes merely to raise these questions, for a review is
certainly no place to quarrel with an author's theory. And the theory in the
present instance is no more than a thread which gives color of sequence to
a unique collection of materials. The selections from documentary sources
which make up a large part of the book are excellent. The arrangement is
original and effective. And the commentary is so well executed that it blends
what might easily have been a mere digest into an essay of unusual quality.
Relations between the United States and its Indian tribes, the international
slave trade, the Berlin African Conference and the Congo Free State, the
doctrine of intervention for humanity, and the Moroccan question are prom·
inent among the topics considered. The author's contribution is unique in
content and scholarly in execution.
EDWIN D. DICKINSON.
COMMERCIAL LAW CASES. By Harold L. Perrin and Hugh Vv. Babb. New
York: George H. Doran Co. 1!)21. Two volumes: pp. xxi, 536; xv, 414.
A reviewer's estimate of any book depends largely upon his attitude
toward its purpose. The present writer confesses a vigorous prejudice in
regard to the purpose and type of this book. Knowledge of law has an
undeniable and most desirable cultural value. It is a s2Iendid background
for the detail affairs of life. But a cultural knowledge of law requires a
broader view than is furnished by the content of "Commercial Law Cases"
and would properly be sought for through a very different course of study.
Whatever value this book has must be found on the practical rather than
the purely cultural side. As a matter of practical, utile value, either very
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much more complete knowledge of law than this type of work can give is
essential, or considerably less knowledge is quite sufficient.
The mistakes made by laymen are seldom errors as to law. This follows from the fact that law is so largely the crystalization of customs and
conventions which men learn uncemsciously. Some time ago this writer
had the pleasure of reviewing a book on Engineering Contracts. Its author
started with the proposition that most litigation over contracts is due to
failure of some one to foresee the disputes of fact which might arise, or
his failure to express clearly his ideas and intention. The book, therefore,
contained only general principles of law and· suggestions as to questions of
fact which engineers ought to foresee and forestall. To a laymen among
engineers it seemed a valuable book, because it recognized that to a layman
imagination was more necessary than law.
The Perrin and Babb book, however, undertakes to teach law as law,
and not to he,lp with questions of fact that might arise in particular lines of
business. It is not in any sense a work of practical advice -to laymen except
as a knowledge of abstract law may be of practical use. In form it purports
to be "a work for general use which combines the text-book and case-method
of teaching law." The two volumes include the subjects of Contracts, Sales,
Agency, Negotiable Instruments, Partnership, and Corporations. There is a
table of cases and a glossary, but no index. Its treatment of the subject of
"sales" seems to be typical. There are four pages of text, defining "sale,"
distinguishing it from certain other transactions, and setting out the Statute
of Frauds. These four pages of text are followed by thirty-four pages of
condensed statements of fact and of opinion from cases involving those
topics. A page and a half of text discusses the subject of "Warranties," and
seventeen pages of condensed cases follo\V. Then come two pages of text
on the "Transfer of Property," and thirty-four pages of cases, followed by
quotation of sections 19, 20, 33, 34, 36, 37, and 38 of the Sales Act of
Massachusetts. Two pages more of text on the "Rights of the Parties" and
thirty-six pages of cases complete the subject. There is a total of thirteen
pages of text, including the sections from the Sales Act.
In neither form nor purpose, it may as well be said frankly, does the
reviewer consider the work to be sound. As to purpose, it teaches, for
instance, that contracts of sale, like other contracts, need a "consideration."
Several pages discuss whether a "sale," as distinct from other transactions
of related nature, requires this consideration to be on a money basis. In the
case on page 278 is a casual dictm1i that a "sale" "differs from a contract of
barter and exchange in this, that in the latter the price, instead of being paid
in money, is paid in goods or merchandise susceptible of valuation." In the
case on page 289 the decision is that an exchange of stock for land is legally
a "sale" within the meaning of the statute concerned. Thus, a reader meets
the conflicting statements that a consideration in terms of money is essential
to a "sale" and that it is not essential, and there is nothing to instruct him
as to which is correct.
Unless the reader of the book knows how to run down precedents and
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to hunt out and apply analogies, he cannot use such learning. It is neither
cultural nor of practical value to laymen.
Similarly, it is of some value to a layman to know that contracts for the
sale of goods over a certain value must be in writing. But it seems misdirected effort for him to learn that some courts construe "sale" rather narrowly in this regard, unless he also learns where the line of distinction is
drawn. There is nothing in the book from which he can either learn or
deduce this. In both these instances the reader is left with a half knowledge which is not only useless; it is dangerous. Thus, the book overshoots
one mark and falls short of the other.
·
This fault is due in large part to the pseudo case-method form of the
book. The true case-method of teaching requires more time than one who
does not want a working knowledge of law can usually afford to spend. It
is based on two theories. One is that law is so far a science that its rules
can be derived by inductive analysis of many judicial phenomena; the other,
that since lawyers find the law in precedent cases, they need training in dis•
tinguishing material facts from immaterial ones, separating dictum from
decision, and otherwise analyzing cases. Neither of these objectives is
reached by "Commercial Law Cases." There are not sufficient cases presented for any induction to be possible. There is no opportunity given for
the comparison and contrast of decisions and development of the common
factor, which occupies so much of true case-method classroom hours, because
the book offers only one case involving any one principle. The cases on
sales, for instance, cover less than 132 pages as compared with 1000 pages in
standard case-books on the subject. The other objective is lost because the
cases are not given in the form in which a lawyer find's them. All training
in analysis, all mental discipline is gone, because the authors themselves
have "sa summarized and abstracted (the cases) as to reduce to a minimum
the tedious verbiage upon which the student ordinarily wastes time." The
book has therefore no advantage over the ordinary legal text-book.
On the other hand, the ordinary text-book is preferable in this, that
while it gives no material for analysis and induction, it is itself the product
of analysis and induction. Unlike mere disconnected excerpts from judicial
opinions, it is written for the purpose of presenting the law in a coherent,
sequential manner. It can, therefore, in the same space as a book of the
type under review, present very much more la\v, freely explained and discussed and fully exemplified.
There is a suggestion in the preface that the authors expect this explanation to be made and the necessary additional information to be imparted by
instructors in the classroom. "It is too often true," says the preface, "that a
text-book leaves little for the instructor to add to the material there presented,
and the course thereby becomes dry and uninteresting." They have, therefore,
"left large scope for the instructor's individual knowledge and point of view."
"It is possible and very practicable to require no reading of the opinion of the
court in many cases." It may be that this shortening of the course by omission of the judicial opinions and' the interpolation of necessary information
by the instructor will meet the objections raised by the reviewer. But
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.such additional information and explanation is not available to one who
studies the book by himself.
Having thus damned the book iii toto, it would seem hardly becoming to
comment even favorably on its details. The reviewer firmly believes that
the basic idea of the book is unsound and its presentation of law quite
unsatisfactory in consequence. His opinion as to the selection of cases and
the manner of condensing them, the relative amount of space given to each
topic, and like matters would be unsympathetic and therefore best not given
at all.
JOHN BARKER W AJ.T-e.
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